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For the animal shall not be measured by man. In a world older and more 
complete than ours, they move finished and complete, gifted with the 
extension of the senses we have lost or never attained, living by voices we 
shall never hear. They are not brethren, they are not underlings: they are 
other nations, caught with ourselves in the net of life and time, fellow 
prisoners of the splendour and travail of the earth.  
 




The ‘cross-race’ or ‘own-race’ effect denotes the increased ease with which humans recognise 
faces from their own race compared to those from other races (Bothwell et al.). This 
phenomenon, whose selective aspect is plastic and may disappear following sufficient exposure 
to other races (Sangrigoli et al.), is equally applicable to interspecies contexts. In fact, nuances in 
appearance, facial definition and expression, body language, and even, or particularly, intra-
community interactions of other animal species can easily be missed if humans are deprived (or 
deprive themselves) of participation in the animals’ worlds, be it direct participation involving 
interaction, or participation by observation alone with the attempt at attunement, albeit at a 
distance, with the animals and their lives. 
 Humans’ ideologically-informed species segregation in their choice of corporeal 
comestibles leaves certain animals particularly vulnerable to depersonalisation and devaluation of 
their individual and social features and competencies. This reflects in the lack of attentional focus 
on these species in scientific inquiries as well as in the attitude of the general public towards 
these species, both of which determine political (in)action. For example, an alarmingly high 
number of humans ask whether the rescued sheep in the present author’s care exhibit distinct 
personalities. Caregivers of individuals belonging to other profoundly instrumentalised and 
depersonalised species, such as chickens, pigs or cows, address similar inquiries.  
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 With an emphasis on land animals bred and raised to satisfy the feeding and clothing 
demands of a large part of the human population, this essay contextualises two distinct, albeit 
correlated, experiential modalities of animal advocates, rescuers and caregivers. The first part 
briefly examines selected relevant psycho-socio-political factors that enable people’s current 
distancing from the reality of animal agriculture and their – largely unwitting – participation in 
the suffering of both the nonhuman animals trapped in the exploitative systems and the humans 
who wish to help them. The second part explores the motivations and capacities of human 
rescuers and caregivers to know and relate to animals in sanctuary and rescue settings, and the 
emerging science which supports them. 
 
Edible Bodies: Caring and Connection / Uncaring and Disconnection  
 
It is not unusual – quite the opposite, in fact – for human societies to assign culturally edible 
bodies among the physically edible bodies in their socio-natural environments. For example, for 
the Amazonian Wari’ people, the physically edible bodies of deceased in-laws represented 
culturally edible bodies. The entire socio-emotional spectrum of action and reaction at the 
occurrence of death, including coping with grief, informed by this ritual was discontinued 
following Western intervention and the introduction of burial practices, which some Wari’ 
people still find discomforting (Harvey 157-160). Animals in some cultures, such as the 
indigenous Australian totemic cultures, may be excluded from groups of animals considered as 
culturally acceptable corporeal comestibles. In most Western cultures pigs, cows, chickens and 
some other species qualify as food, but others, such as dogs and cats, are spared because of their 
assigned privilege as companion animals. Stemming from this culturally-shaped normativity, 
Westerners are quick to condemn as savage those Asian communities that consume dogs and cats 
(and of course those humans practicing cannibalism), ignorant of (or perhaps simply ignoring) 
the fact that the Western species segregation is equally arbitrary and a mere result of the 
ideology of ‘carnism’, as Melanie Joy terms it.  
 Following a visit to a pig slaughterhouse, activist Belinda Morris describes her encounter 
with one of the pigs awaiting slaughter. She speaks to those who do not or will not see the 
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suffering of ‘food animals’ and to those who cannot unsee and unhear it. Referring to the pig she 
met but couldn’t rescue, Morris writes: 
The people you pass on the street, your friends, colleagues, family, are they the ones 
who are going to eat her corpse and never give her a thought? Do they care how 
frightened she was? Why do they not care? Why did she not matter to them? 1 
The disconnect between those who see and those who do not sets up an intra-specific 
discordance, a ragged flaw in the fabric of human society. Morris, who, as a seasoned rescuer 
and caregiver, is well aware of the individuality and bio-psycho-social complexity of each animal 
going through the killing line, concludes: ‘Walking through a slaughterhouse tears pieces out of 
your heart. Living amongst those who keep the slaughterhouses in business does the same.’  
 By and large, caring for and about animals other than humans is still seen as softness, 
implying weakness (Oliver), if not as outright pathological (Gazzola), depending in part on the 
degree of care and the species in question. At the same time, most people actively seek to avoid 
witnessing the cruelty that they themselves support with their everyday choices, when evidence 
is presented to them. The phenomenon is not new. For example, Tolstoy’s attempts to convince 
his acquaintance to visit the slaughter yards with him were unsuccessful, despite the fact that the 
acquaintance himself was a hunter and not unused to killing (40).2 A letter published in The 
Farmer’s Magazine in 1848 by a neighbour of the Smithfield market in London, calling for the 
closure of the market because the sights and sounds of animal suffering at the hand of humans 
‘produce an impression on the beholders that no person can adequately describe’(142), is  
also telling.   
 Progressively, slaughter and so-called animal agriculture more generally have become a 
concentrated operation, removed from public view (Fitzgerald). The distancing and 
concealment in relation to current farming practices and slaughter enable humans, in the words 
of Timothy Pachirat, ‘to eat meat without the killers or the killing, without even … the animals 
themselves’ (3). The live, pulsing, feeling animal is rendered into the abstraction of a happy cow 
on a milk carton, or a defiant bull on a restaurant sign, which in no way depicts the brutal 
suffering that the effigy’s real counterpart endures. The steak and the chicken breast exist 
disconnected to the once living animal; body parts are elective courses to entertain the palate. 
Yet animals are still here, bleeding and bleating louder and more numerous than ever.3 At the 
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same time the pressure on activists is growing, with industry-lobbied governments in the U.S., 
Australia and elsewhere attempting to criminalise investigative operations and comparing them 
to terrorism.4 People dedicated to exposing the hidden violence perpetrated on animals in 
agriculture and other exploitative and/or extermination environments, including in the wild, 
are consequently caught between an aggressive government, supported by a powerful and 
profit-driven industry, and a mostly apathetic public, which is capable of ending the violence 
but, if it continues to be kept in the dark, will not.  
 The general denial of and active resistance to witnessing the gravity of the situation 
nonhuman animals have been driven into for human interest find some theoretical grounds in the 
system justification theory (Jost and Banaji 1994; for review see Jost, Banaji and Nosek 2004), 
which predicts humans’ tendency to perceive the larger system that one is embedded into and 
dependent upon in a positive light, regardless of how bad the system may be. The research in 
this area focuses primarily on the human intraspecies context and the puzzling desire to keep the 
status quo even by groups and individuals who would obviously directly benefit from a change. 
Nevertheless, system justification can easily be observed in relation to the treatment of animals, 
with the wider public believing (or wanting to believe) that the system has provisions in place to 
ensure that animals do not suffer while they are being deprived of agency, mutilated, crammed 
into cages or pens and abused in numerous other ways before eventually being slaughtered, 
regardless of the amount of available evidence demonstrating the opposite. This tendency, 
combined with the general urge to justify cognitive inconsistencies in order to reduce ideological 
dissonance reported by researchers in cognitive dissonance (Wicklund and Brehm, cited in Jost 
et al. 2004), may result in a communication conundrum whereby the suffering animals and the 
humans who suffer with them and advocate for their freedom may be perceived as the ones 
victimising the perpetrators (both farmers and consumers) and credited with extremism, 
intolerance and aggression, or simply dismissed as over-emotional or even mad, as noted above.   
 However, when paths  are uncovered which help reach members of the general public 
with undeniable evidence of systemic torture, people’s responses reveal the system’s betrayal of 
both nonhuman animals and the humans who unwittingly support it and who are ultimately 
responsible for it. A street action known as ‘video challenge’ is a case in point. The video 
challenge project consists in recruiting people in the street to watch a short graphic, narrated 
video of animals exploited for human consumption.5 In exchange, the viewers receive a small 
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financial or food reward. It appears that despite the potentially distracting public venues, the 
setup with a laptop and headphones offers sufficient intimacy for the viewers to respond to the 
material presented with unguarded candour, leading to reactions of shock, horror, and often 
tears. It is perhaps surprising that, at least in the experience of the present author, there is no 
anger towards the activists for exposing the viewers to this violence, there is no attempt by the 
viewers to justify the violence as often happens in discussions with consumers of animal products 
who refuse to confront the reality of animal farming, nor is there any attempt to dismiss the 
violence as ‘single occurrences’ – the latter most likely due to the fact that the film shows 
various invasive procedures which are routinely performed in animal agriculture (for example, 
beak trimming, the grounding of live male chickens, tail docking, et cetera.), as well as of 
course slaughter itself.  
 Naturally, there is no guarantee that the viewers will act upon their new knowledge 
with a firm and lasting commitment to implement changes on a personal level and withdraw 
from participation in the abuse of the kind they just witnessed. Nevertheless, in addition to 
receiving crucial insight into the practice of contemporary meat, egg and milk industries, this 
experience may help the viewers understand the shallowness of the calls for tolerance and 
acceptance of people’s (mostly uninformed) choice to consume animals, whereby consumption 
of animals is viewed as a personal matter with no repercussions for the freedom and wellbeing of 
other feeling beings. It may also help the viewers appreciate the strength (as opposed to the 
often cited weakness) of people who expose themselves to this violence on a regular basis as 
rescuers, carers and/or advocates, and the psychological burden they carry due to such 
exposure.  
 The right often invoked by the general public to use nonhuman animals for their own 
convenience not only hurts the animals in question, it also constitutes violence against other 
humans as it may instigate vicarious trauma and grief. Vicarious trauma and grief describe the 
traumatisation and grief induced by exposure to a primary victim’s experience, affecting 
professionals and volunteers who work with human and nonhuman animal victims of violence 
(Kastenbaum; McCann and Pearlman). The symptoms are comparable to those experienced by 
first-hand victims and can be equally debilitating, with potentially negative consequences for the 
individual’s personal and professional life. Recent studies which have looked at the effects of 
working with victims of violence in sanctuary and shelter workers  and the emerging evidence of 
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psychological distress in veterinarians  and animal control workers  further testify to the reality 
of the impact the suffering of nonhuman animals can have on those human animals who are left 
to deal with the mostly human-induced damage, and the need for diversified strategies to be 
adopted by workers and activists to protect themselves from such and promote the strength 
needed to continue the work (see, respectively, Bradshaw, Borchers and  Muller-Paisner; Nett 
et al. and Tiesman et al.). 
 
You see me, but do you hear me?6     
 
Spreading awareness of the physical pain and discomfort suffered by animals in exploitative 
industries is, understandably, central to all animal protection advocacy, be it abolitionist or 
regulatory in nature. However, the focus on physical pain can dim other equally important 
aspects of an animal’s being and encourage further objectification of animals and the notion that 
enslavement and exploitation might be better justified should that pain be absent or reduced.7  
The widely practiced instrumentalisation of animals, with its constant and systemic attempts to 
silence them, represses the expression of their being – a being that the human has appropriated 
and expects to function principally for human interest – and largely ignores aspects of positive 
sentience,8 such as rewards and pleasures (Balcombe) and the need for self-determination, which 
appear to be equally important for wellbeing. Ironically, it also robs humans of the knowledge of 
other animals that they seem – for various purposes ranging from mere curiosity or fascination 
to facilitated exploitation – determined to increase. 
 
On Sheep and Other Primates 
Groundless human projections are quickly evoked to dismiss the proposal of nonhuman animals 
possessing characteristics capable of disturbing the biblical foundations promoting human 
supremacy, upon which the Western mind was built and within the framework of which it 
continues to operate even in secular circles. But increasingly, students of animals’ intra- and 
interpersonal competencies agree that accusations of such projections (‘anthropomorphising’) 
are often premature and uninformed; they emphasise instead the importance of participating in 
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the animals’ world, understanding how it works. Otherwise, ‘chances are, you either ignore 
them entirely, or you misunderstand them’ (Brown). Further, the greater the human economic 
and ideological investment in the instrumentalisation of particular species, the less appears to be 
the motivation to explore and understand the life and being of these species, their social fabric 
and individuality within it. In relation to social intelligence, primatologist turned sheepologist, 
Thelma Rowell, draws parallels between the methodological faults (and consequent misleading 
results9) of early primatology – before primatology shifted from ethological to more 
anthropological research methods (Despret 2006) – and the continuing ethological approach in 
research of sheep communities. In the words of Vinciane Despret:  
[A]s far as their social expertise is concerned, these animals are certainly on a par with 
apes. To put it simply, they are organized – so much so, in fact, that they warrant the 
title recently awarded to dolphins, hyenas and elephants, of ‘honorary primate’ (…) Of 
all animals, sheep are precisely those that until now have been given the fewest chances. 
They have been the victims of what Thelma Rowell calls ‘a hierarchical scandal’ in 
ethology: ‘we have given primates multiple chances; we know just about nothing about 
the others.’ Of course we know things about them, but clearly those things are 
incomparable to what we know about apes. The more research advances, the more 
interesting the questions about apes become, and the more these animals turn out to be 
endowed with elaborate social and cognitive competencies. By contrast, questions about 
the others still primarily concern what they eat. (2006) 
A similar criticism of ‘primate chauvinism’ (deWaal, quoted in Abbott, 414) was recently 
advanced in relation to the social and cognitive intelligence of fishes, largely citing Redouan 
Bshary’s work (Abbott). In essence, humans have blatantly taken everything away from 
nonhuman animals – to resort to a hyperbole – and turned them into unfeeling, unthinking 
objects for humans’ own convenience. Now the animals have to depend on human research 
ingenuity and attentional focus to prove humans wrong, and possibly change their attitudes 
towards other animals.  
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Knowing in Sanctuary 
The primary purpose of sanctuaries for rescued animals is not research per se, but an attempt to 
provide a safe environment free of physical and other suffering, as well as encouraging positive 
sentience and self-determination (as much as an ultimately still captive setting allows it). In 
order to achieve these goals, however, informal but nonetheless meticulous research and 
observations are de facto being carried out on a daily basis for the entire duration of the animals’ 
residency at the sanctuary, a residency which normally lasts until death. The relational dynamics 
characteristic of these settings offers alternative modalities of knowing and understanding 
animals, which inform methods of care as well as advocacy. Considering the difference between 
true wellbeing and ‘welfare’ – a term that has largely grown to denote attempts to reduce 
animal suffering under exploitative conditions10 – long-time activist and rescuer Patty Mark 
suggests that it may be easier to understand the extent of the violence and deprivation animals 
endure in an exploitative context by considering these same animals in a sanctuary environment 
after they have been rescued. ‘The damage becomes much more evident when the animals are at 
last allowed autonomy,’ she says, when they are given the freedom, for example, to not be 
touched, picked up, restricted, immobilised by a foreign hand, ‘when you watch them 
protecting and nurturing their bodies and selves like we do our own, when you watch them 
slowly heal physically and psychologically – sometimes it takes years – beginning to enjoy life 
and friendships with other animals, including humans’ (107).  
 The intersubjective space of being together, created by the partners (the rescued 
animals and their carers), enables a relatively fluid transfer of information (albeit of nonverbal 
nature) and relationship-building. Dismantling the prejudicial barrier based on culturally primed 
species segregation uncovers new foundations which enable a more comprehensive 
understanding of other animals, promoting empathic recognition and informing humans’ 
attitude towards them. ‘All animals,’ as Tom Regan puts it, ‘are somebody – someone with a 
life of their own. Behind those eyes is a story, the story of their life in their world as they 
experience it.’ The ability to hear these stories is no empty projection of a delusional and 
overemotional self, as it is often derided as being. The ability to hear them is critical to ensure 
the best possible care and physical as well as emotional and mental rehabilitation. Aside from 
strictly medical aspects, such care has to take into consideration a myriad of species-specific 
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properties, both cultural and natural, along with, of course, the personal specificities of the 
individual in question.  
 As a consequence of this subjective encounter, of living and being together with other 
animal species, and in certain circumstances being able to experience their group dynamics, 
sanctuary caregivers (including humans who provide sanctuary/home to singular companion 
animals, like cats and dogs) may develop capacities of seeing, hearing and understanding animals 
in ways that many other humans cannot. Unlike humans who participate in the exploitation of 
other animals and whose vision is by definition blurred as a consequence of this utilitarian 
‘relationship,’ sanctuary caregivers are freer of the mental and practical limitations that such 
instrumentalisation entails and their interest is focused on true wellbeing of the animals in care. 
Most of them are also much less constrained by the doctrinal requirements that govern Western 
science, which is itself embedded in a tradition replete with interpretational and methodological 
errors, some of which are noted in this essay. Mindless anthropomorphising would not just be a 
futile process, but it can also adversely impact the animal in care. Thus it is essential to create a 
space which, while recognising species-specific characteristics, allows the development of an 
adequate level of intercommunication, in which the human listens, as a non-passive recipient, to 
the individual nonhuman animals (and/or a community of animals) who are telling their story. 
Each animal is a product of nature and nurture, i.e. genes and the socio-natural environment 
he/she grew up in and is embedded into; as such each animal is unique, as are his/her story and 
individual needs. The failure to recognise this stems not from the animals’ lacki of individuality 
and complexity but from humans’ not spending enough time with them, as marine mammal 
expert Toni Frohoff (cited in Siebert) indicates, or approaching them with a predetermined, 
culturally-biased, oftentimes voyeuristic attitude which does not allow them to truly hear them. 
What emerges from this process is an extremely complex picture of animals’ psycho-social 
existence, congruent with various theoretical frameworks, some of which are discussed below, 
indicating the need for a paradigm shift, a shift unlikely to happen if the attention remains on 
how to justify the use of animals instead of on the animals themselves. 
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More Than Meets the Eye  
Donald Broom and Ken Johnson  famously wrote that millions of years of evolution and 
adaptation cannot be overridden by a few thousand years of domestication and a few decades of 
close confinement (33). They cite, specifically, the unlikelihood of a hen adapting to live in a 
cage any time soon, regardless of the level of genetic manipulation involved. More recently, 
G.A. Bradshaw (2005; 2009) took a step further and established the field of trans-species 
psychology (TSP). TSP is based on current available evidence which indicates that while 
morphological differences among the brains of various animal species result in the information 
being distributed and processed differently as a consequence of adaptation to specific physical 
environments, the differences are not qualitative in nature. TSP works on the premise that 
animals (including humans) are born with specific neurobiological dispositions that require 
specific socio-natural environmental input for physically and emotionally balanced development. 
The disruption of the biological and/or historical normative (e.g. by anthropogenic 
interference) affects the delicate balance that has slowly emerged through the species’ evolution 
and the manner in which this predicates optimal developmental and living conditions. This leads 
to compromised wellbeing and, when the stressors intensify to unmanageable levels, to the 
emergence of severe psychological scars and trauma, which not only affect the wellbeing of the 
individual in question but, via trans-generational transfer, also impacts on posterity (see for 
example Bagot and Meaney; DeGregorio).11 The trauma imprinted in the animal’s subconscious 
can only be adequately accessed and reorganised (aiming at healing) by providing a secure 
environment where the affected animals are given the opportunity to re-create themselves as 
new, mentally balanced individuals. This is a space that allows and encourages self-
determination and mutual respect as opposed to imposing control. The healing approach is a 
relational model, reflecting the importance of non-linguistic, right-brain-to-right-brain affective 
communication (Schore 2011) and attachment relations (in the formative period but also later in 
life) for normative development and functioning, and the necessity of recreating a positive 
developmental context for successful repair when disruption occurs.  
 Neuropsychologist Allan Schore accuses the behavioural model and its successor, the 
cognitive-behavioural model, of having ‘plagued psychiatry and psychology’ to the detriment of 
human wellbeing (2012, 4). Similarly, proponents and practitioners of TSP agree that focusing 
on behaviour – behaviour being a symptom not the cause – and attempting to correct behaviour 
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alone does nothing to address or eliminate the root of the problem. As a consequence, the 
wellbeing of the animal(s) continues to be compromised even though the behaviour may appear 
more in tune with humans’ expectations: ‘broken’ on the outside (behaviourally), but likely 
broken inside, too. This widespread approach to animals under study and in attempted 
rehabilitation also appears to propagate the objectification of animals more generally, further 
dimming options of learning to appreciate the complexity nature has endowed them with. 
 Behaviourism, as the practice of conveying exclusively what one could see, Carl Safina 
notes, developed as a necessity to establish the study of animal behaviour as a science at a time 
when brain science was in its infancy and little systemic observation had been made of free-living 
animals conducting their normative lives (26). This ‘objective’ approach was also intended to 
dispel many myths surrounding nonhuman animals, stemming from centuries of folklore and 
superstition, portraying animals as caricatures of human vices and virtues. ‘In establishing the 
study of behaviour as a science,’ Safina writes, ‘it had originally been helpful to make 
“anthropomorphism” a word that raised the red flag. But as lesser intellects followed the Nobel 
Prize-winning pioneers [Konrad Lorenz, Nikolaas Tinbergen and Karl von Frisch], 
“anthropomorphism” became a pirate flag. If the word was hoisted, an attack was  
imminent’ (27).  
 Behaviourism managed to instigate and consolidate the fear of anthropomorphism, 
which remains widespread today. The objectivity that behaviourism strived for, however, fell 
short of expectations. There is always more than meets the eye, and the nature of the attention 
the observer applies also plays its part. This can lead, for example, to ignoring species 
culturally/ideologically deemed uninteresting, such as sheep, or paying excessive attention to 
certain behaviours while ignoring others of equal or higher relevance for the overall 
understanding of an observed individual or community. In her book Animal Friendships, 
zoologist Anne Dagg laments that for a long time research focused on aggressive and 
reproductive behaviours among nonhuman animals and ignored the less ‘exciting’ though more 
regular congenial relations, undoubtedly contributing to the heavily distorted picture humans 
still nurture of other animals’ lives and relations. In The Evolution of Morality and Religion, 
Donald Broom concurs that cooperation and convivial behaviours are more common, and 
reminds the reader that when considering sociality within animal communities, it is critical to 
take into account not only what individuals do but also what they do not do. In fact, ‘[m]ost 
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altruistic behaviour involves refraining from doing things which would be easy to do but which 
would harm others, even if the perpetrator might benefit in some way from doing this’  
(2003, 40).   
 Ultimately, the observed phenomena cannot escape subjective evaluation and 
interpretation as humans are faced with choices of actions which impact on nonhuman animals. 
For example, deciding that nonhuman animals’ interpersonal relationships don’t matter is no 
more objective than deciding they do matter. The bond between mother and infant is a well-
recognised phenomenon, both in scholarly literature and in popular knowledge. The disruption 
of this bond can lead to production loss in animals exploited for their bodies and secretions; 
therefore, effort has been put into research attempting to minimise the inconvenience, resulting, 
for example, in various available techniques of forced weaning (e.g. Schichowski, Moors and 
Gauly). Even when it comes to ‘commodities’ such as farm animals, the bond is obviously there, 
but, production loss aside, by and large the bond does not matter.  
 
Born To Be Free 
Ironically, it was to the work of ethologist Konrad Lorenz and other ethological enquiries at the 
time that John Bowlby, the father of (human) attachment theory, owed his breakthrough as he 
was trying to get away from contemporary human-orientated behavioural theories and 
approaches in the field of interpersonal attachment (Bretherton). The latter were centred 
around food acquisition and unable to explain the empirical data demonstrating adverse effects 
on the development of infants subjected to separation from caregivers. Harlow’s invasive 
experiments on rhesus monkeys provided further confirmation that ‘man’ (and other animals) 
cannot live by milk alone, as he put it (1958, 677).12  Further research has revealed that the 
caregiver as the infant’s primary source of external stimuli (for humans and other animals), acts, 
in conjunction with the infant’s own system, as a regulatory power for essential developmental 
processes, which affect both the individual’s psychobiological adaptiveness as well as gene 
expression (summarised in Bradshaw and Schore 2006). The primary caregiver’s capacity to 
mediate the infant’s affective arousal states contributes to the development of an experiential 
matrix, which creates a sense of safety for the infant and encourages further explorative 
behaviour of the social and physical environment. This secure attachment ultimately leads to 
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adaptive physical and mental health. Poor and dysregulated transmissions within the attachment 
relations are ‘affectively burnt’ (Schore 2012, 35) into the infant’s maturing brain, with the 
brain consequentially developing unconscious internal working models based on insecurity  
with potentially vulnerable psycho-physiological outcomes and trans-generational transfer, as 
noted above. 
 However, and fortunately, the capacity for interpersonal psycho-bio-regulation 
continues into adulthood (Hofer), which opens doors to opportunities for healing. Most of the 
animals in sanctuaries come from dysfunctional developmental conditions and/or have suffered 
physical and/or mental trauma later in life. They do not come equipped with biographies; 
sometimes little or nothing is known about their past. It is the role of the sanctuary caregiver to 
attempt to compile such a biography, to work their way through the complex internal landscape 
of the rescued individuals to ensure optimal psycho-physical care and to promote wellbeing. A 
sufficient level of ‘working knowledge’ is usually attainable by means of the intersubjective 
space and nonverbal communication proposed above. While sanctuaries, like any other captive 
environment, in most cases do not enable full self-determination (partly for the animals’ own 
safety), 13  allowing the animals co-participation in the healing process and their own lives instead 
of exercising control, enhancing positive aspects of sentience, and showing them respect instead 
of trying to infantilise them, can ensure a higher level of wellbeing and restore some of the 
animals’ dignity. 
 In her book Interspecies Ethics, Cynthia Willett reminds the reader of African-American 
abolitionist Frederick Douglass’ doubts that an appeal to the moral sentiments of white people 
would suffice to abolish black slavery: 
White people could not generate sympathy for a slave unless that slave asserted some 
significant degree of agency and demanded, through that assertion of agency, 
recognition from others… A display of vulnerability and an appeal for sympathy do not 
suffice to generate the solidarity that an egalitarian political ethics requires. (38) 
If Douglass was correct, and the odds are he was, how can nonhuman animals, particularly 
captive so-called farm animals, these ‘quasi-artefacts’ of ours, to use Freya Mathews’ 
unflattering description, ever exhibit a level of agency sufficient to demonstrate equality without 
risk of being shot for it? Mathews does not seem to think such endeavour is necessary. While 
SOMEONE NOT SOMETHING 
 
66 
domestication was wrong when it occurred, she opines, and it would be equally wrong to try to 
domesticate wild animals in the future, this does not mean that the farming of species that are 
already domesticated is wrong today. The ‘pact’ between our and their species permits us to use 
them for our own purposes. ‘They are no longer sovereign beings,’ Mathews writes, ‘they owe 
their existence to us… We are obliged to care for them but we also have certain rights over 
their destiny’ (264). This is a curious but not uncommon position, and as such it deserves 
further consideration. It is beyond the scope of this article to attempt elaboration of the often 
cited ‘pact’ that humans want to believe they have with oppressed species. However, adhering 
to the nature of argumentation in the present article, at least three of the numerous points that 
question the ethics and logic of defending animal agriculture and its inherent instrumentalisation 
should be given some brief attention here. 
 Firstly, the position that domestication occurred in the distant past, and that at present 
we are simply left with ancestral ‘artefacts’ which we have an obligation to look after, is both 
inaccurate and highly misleading. Animals trapped in the exploitative systems sprung with and 
promoted by domestication are subjected to ongoing manipulation to increase production and 
profit. Over the past sixty years the size of a broiler chicken has quadrupled (Zuidhof et al.), 
bodies of other animals, enslaved for human dietary choices, such as turkeys and pigs, have also 
substantially increased in size, leaving their underdeveloped bones and internal organs struggling 
to keep up with the unnatural body mass they are supposed to support but often cannot. ‘They 
are bred to be slaughtered at six months of age,’ explained a sanctuary owner whose hallway has 
been taken up by a disabled rescued pig suffering from apophysiolysis:14 ‘this and similar 
conditions are not uncommon, particularly in breeding sows, who are obviously kept alive past 
the six months’ (Vesenjak-Kutlačić; Vizcaíno et al.). Sheep are another species under constant 
attack. In Australia, about one in four lambs (fifteen million annually) dies from exposure. To 
address production loss, the industry is engaging in genetic manipulation aiming at increasing the 
number of lambs per birth, pushing the mothers well beyond their physical (and undoubtedly 
emotional) limits, likely increasing death rates of lambs, although the overall number of lambs to 
be turned into meat may nevertheless increase (Animals Australia). 
 The second point, which is also often ignored by proponents of animal agriculture 
(‘humane’ or other) is the animals’ interpersonal bonds and social structures. Animals who are 
allowed a measure of physical and psychological freedom exhibit social preferences (Bode, 
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Wood and Franks) and can form deep, lasting bonds (for example Holland), inclusive of but not 
limited to the parent-child dyad. When humans claim rights over animals’ destinies and enact 
such rights, for example by choosing to kill someone from the community, they may be 
breaking up meaningful interpersonal relations as well as affecting the animals on a societal level. 
When the question of human grief and loss is considered within a multicultural framework, as it 
should be, and is subsequently stripped of the various culture-specific attributes used to 
propagate the myth of human uniqueness, it appears that there is nothing species-specific about 
human loss that couldn’t be applied interspecifically, as the present author has suggested in the 
past (2013).   
 The third point returns to Broom and Johnson’s assertion, cited above, of the perpetual 
victory of evolution and adaptation over domestication. As an example, they discuss the 
Australian wild boar – communities of domesticated pigs who had strayed from farms and 
successfully returned to a wild state (33). More recently, communities of rescued hens and 
roosters at the VINE sanctuary in the U.S. achieved something similar, 15 and now inhabit the 
nearby forest, living a wild life, free from human intervention (jones).  
 Could such re-wilding be the strongest demonstration of agency that nonhuman animals 
could offer, along the lines of Douglass’ thinking, to convince humans of their equality and 
desire for freedom – a kind of peaceful revolution, Mandela-style rather than Orwellian? Are 
not the animals who have freed themselves from slavery demonstrating just that: the desire to be 
free and the capacity to live this freedom, which includes negotiations with a highly complex 
socio-natural environment that goes beyond food acquisition and reproduction success, 
requiring high levels of cognitive and emotional sophistication, which is increasingly being 
recognised for nonhuman animal societies? Admittedly, most domesticated animals would not 
be able to survive in the wild, mainly due to the genetic mutilations humans have subjected their 
bodies to. But have humans managed to destroy their soul?          
  





In the 1970s and 1980s, Donald Griffin and Gordon Burghardt began advocating for the 
inclusion of the subjective mental experiences of nonhuman animals into the field of cognitive 
ethology (Griffin, 482). This proposition was met with some resistance at first, but over the 
following decades an increasing number of scientists have embraced the idea of nonhuman 
animals’ subjective lives, enabling animals’ subjectivity to grow from a taboo topic into the 
widely popularised subject that it is today. Similarly, ten years after Bradshaw (2005) first 
proposed trans-species psychology following her diagnosis of PTSD in elephants, recognition of 
human-comparable psychological effects of violence and depravation on nonhuman animals is on 
the rise (Dasgupta). The growing scholarly appreciation of human-nonhuman animal 
comparability reflects the general public’s expanding awareness of other animals’ lives and 
being. However, millennia-long conditioning, which has propagated speciesism, carnism and 
instrumentalisation, continues to impede the appreciation of the complexities of animals’ 
individualities and their sociality both on scholarly and popular levels, precluding political 
change. Through participation in their lives, through encounters that do not a priori supress the 
other (regardless of whether the other is a human or a nonhuman animal), modalities of knowing 
and understanding emerge that are likely to be missed when such relatability is dismissed in 
advance. Had Derrida reached out to the cat instead of pondering over her otherness, how much 
of the philosophy of the Takers (Quinn)16 would he have been able to bring down with a single 
act? Such acts occur regularly in sanctuaries, and increasingly even in science. They testify to the 
animals’ sophisticated cognitive, psychological and social capacities that have emerged through 
parallel evolution – that is, not below but along with ours – suggesting that their ancient selves, 
regardless of human intervention, remain pretty much alive. The humans who have grown to 
embrace other animal nations as equals enjoy the delicate beauty trans-species 
communitarianism has to offer, but they also experience immense grief stemming from the 
anthropogenic violence their conspecifics perpetrate upon these nations. It is time, now, that 
people extended some consideration to that grief, and all that it signifies. 
  





1 Published on social media (Facebook) 24 March 2015. Used with author’s permission. 
2 It is beyond the scope of this essay to delve into the question of differences between hunting 
versus slaughterhouse and farm work. Suffice to note that the physical distance between the 
hunter and the hunted, characteristic of most hunting practices, may allow an amplitude of 
psychological distancing that may not be affordable on the killing floor of a slaughterhouse, and 
people may also perceive hunting as being more of a ‘fair game’ compared to the slaughterhouse 
where animals are forced to in order to be slaughtered with no chance of escaping such fate. 
3 According to conservative figures from the U.N. Food and Agriculture organisation the 
number of land animals killed for food annually exceeds sixty-five billion. Cited in the FARM 
report, available at: http://farmusa.org/statistics11.html (Accessed 25 August 2015). Figures 
for aquatic animals are unavailable.  
4 The FBI considers the animal rights and environmental movements the number one domestic 
terrorist threat. So-called ‘ag-gag’ laws, criminalising documentation and the spreading of 
evidence of corporate animal abuse, have been introduced in various states in the U.S.: 
http://www.greenisthenewred.com/blog/about/ (Accessed 26 August 2015). Similar 
initiatives are currently being undertaken in Australia, see for example 
https://www.voiceless.org.au/the-issues/ag-gag (Accessed 26 August 2015). The first ag-gag 
legislation, disguised as a biosecurity bill, was passed in NSW in September 2015. 
5 The idea is not new. It features already in the award-winning documentary film The Witness 
(2000), but it was successfully revived in June 2015 by a group of activists in Sydney, Australia, 
and is currently spreading around the world.  
6 Cf. Bradshaw, G.A. ‘You see me, but do you hear me? The science and sensibility of trans-
species dialogue’. Feminism & Psychology, no. 20, 2010, pp. 407–419. 
7 This is something animal advocates should be well aware of to avoid dissemination of undesired 
messages among the broader public.  
 
 




8  Increased sensitivity to nonhuman animals as complex socio-biological entities has sprung a 
‘movement’ within animal welfare circles advocating for greater consideration of positive 
sentience by factoring in environment- and sociality-focused needs and potentialities as markers 
of wellbeing along with the absence of negative stimuli (see, for example, Mellor; Yeates and 
Main). While this is certainly a refreshing perspective, its practical limitations are not 
insignificant. The observance of positive sentience could lead to the emergence of a boutique 
industry, which could serve its own purpose and possibly benefit a small number of animals, but 
it appears to be an unrealistic option to solve the current pressing issue of animal wellbeing. 
Such industry would be unable to meet the current demands for animal products by the ever 
growing human population (see note 3) for various reasons, including our planet’s space 
limitations, and it could certainly not match the current financial affordability of animal 
products, which in an environment of growing economic pressure is not a negligible factor. 
Further, apart from animals forming the heart of the production line to whom regulations 
concerning positive welfare could apply to various extents, the current establishments also 
comprise animals that are deemed completely superfluous by the businesses in question (for 
example, male chickens in the egg industry); as such these animals need to be disposed of in 
timely fashion and in ways that are financially the least impactful. Higher ‘humane’ standards 
would have to address the issue of these superfluous animals as well as the question of slaughter 
of both animals raised for meat and so-called spent animals in other exploitative sectors of 
agribusiness; see also note 10. Ultimately, animal agriculture is a business and its existence 
depends on its profitability. If the latter is challenged by welfare standards, the business will 
either cease to exist or it will find ways of disguising or underplaying the abuse. This is already 
happening with issues concerning basic physical ‘painism’ and is also reflected in the widespread 
misleading advertising of so-called free-range and similar settings implying (but not necessarily 
implementing) higher welfare standards to please the public and its growing awareness of animal 
use and abuse.     
9 An interesting example that sparked and perpetrated the myth of aggression and competition as 
a societal norm in primates’ communities comes from research on baboons, albeit the erroneous 
research conclusions were less a result of inadequate observation than they were of the highly 
unnatural and traumatogenic captive environment the research was conducted in. As Despret 
summarises, from the observations of baboons in the London zoo in the late 1920s by zoologist 
 




Solly Zuckerman a thesis was developed which presupposed dominance-hierarchy as the main 
principle of social organisation in primate societies generally. This thesis remained dominant for 
several decades to the extent that when the dominance principle could not be observed in a 
particular primate community, the apparent absence of it would be conceptualised as ‘latent 
dominance’ (Despret 2009).   
10 See note 7. In her interview Mark recalls that ‘the worst suffering and torment I’ve ever 
witnessed was in a New South Wales slaughterhouse when a group of free-range pigs were 
brought in for slaughter. Coming from their “good life” on the paddocks, to the noisy, crowded 
kill lines where they could hear other pigs screaming, smell the blood; they panicked, anguished 
and in fear, their mouths foamed, their eyes rolled. No words can describe it’ (109). 
11 A recent study demonstrates trans-generational effects of neonatal experience (tail- docking 
and simulated mild infection) on pain responses in sheep (Clark et al.). 
12 Harlow’s methods involved removing baby rhesus monkeys from their natural mothers and 
exposing them to mother surrogates. Two types of mother surrogates were developed: an 
unpleasantly hard surrogate made of wire-mesh, and a soft, cloth surrogate able to supply higher 
contact comfort than the wire version. The experiments show absence of attachment to the wire 
figure even when ‘she’ was the sole food provider. 
13 In some rare cases rescued animals have managed to return to a wild state (jones). 
14 Fracture of the ischial tuberosity of the tail bone.  
15 http://vine.bravebirds.org/  
16 The notion of Takers as contrasted with Leavers is rendered beautifully by Anthony Hopkins 
as protagonist of the film Instinct, 1999.  
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